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## Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's Stance Towards the Christian Kingdoms in Al-Andalus

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**Abstract:** This study examines the stance of Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil towards the Christian kingdoms in Al-Andalus during his rule. Following the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate in the Levant, Abd al-Rahman I successfully established an independent emirate in Al-Andalus, navigating both internal and external challenges. A significant aspect of his governance was his strategic response to the Christian kingdoms in northern Spain, which continuously sought to reclaim lost territories and challenge Muslim rule. The study explores his military campaigns, diplomatic efforts, and policies aimed at securing the stability of the Umayyad state. Despite initial successes in repelling Christian advances and imposing tributary agreements, internal strife within Al-Andalus weakened its ability to maintain long-term control over contested regions. The research underscores the pivotal role of political unity in sustaining territorial dominance and highlights how Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's leadership shaped the early Islamic state in Iberia.

**Keywords:** Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil, Al-Andalus, Umayyad Emirate, Christian Kingdoms, Medieval Spain, Military Strategy, Political Stability.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Al-Andalus was a province under the authority of Damascus, and sometimes of the Ifriqiya governor. This remained the case until the downfall of the Umayyad dynasty in the Levant and the ascension of the Abbasid Caliphate, which, became the legitimate rulers of the Islamic world. Al-Andalus, during Abbasid hegemony was just another province ruled by a local emir together with the help of emissaries that helped govern and organize the region.

At the age of the governors, Al Andalus was devoid of the fundamentals of statehood, the pillars of sovereignty were not consolidated, and no cosmic structure for the longevity of the people was in place. Yet, when Emir Abd al-Rahman I (Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil) reached Al-Andalus, he showed extraordinary skills, will, and bravery. These strengths allowed him to forge an independent emirate, breaking with the Abbasid state in Baghdad. Abd al-Rahman moved on important state-building functions, such as documentation of administrative records, enforcement of laws, development of infrastructure, appropriation of financial resources, administration of justice, arrangement of military forces, and creation of strong governance. These initiatives set the stage for a secure and long-lasting state, as Al-Andalus evolved into a prosperous polity with effective governance and sophisticated administrative arrangements.

Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil faced significant challenges, both internal and external. But with determination, ardent work, and the careful selection of his aides, ministers, chamberlains, and advisors—men who showed loyalty, ability, and diligence—he managed to unite the

emirate. The policies and institutions they implemented laid the groundwork for the state, which allowed for the drafting of clear state policy and administrative systems.

Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil faced one of the greatest perils in the form of the Christian kingdoms. These groups actively rallied to face the new Islamic warrior, who had essentially put down internal revolts. Abd al-Rahman wanted to orient his attention to dealing with this existential external enemy. The Christian rulers, seeing the opportunity, expanded their lands by conquering large territories and annexing them to their kingdoms, threatening the Arab-Islamic rule in Al-Andalus.

This study is important to investigate the strategic responses of Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil to the Christian emirates, along with his achievements of military victories in northern Christian territories and his imposition of tribute on them. Although these skirmishes never completely stopped, the Christian kingdoms never lost the opportunity to take advantage of weaknesses in the Umayyad state in al-Andalus. So in the end they won, when the state grew weaker from internal strife and eventually crumbled and all of its institutions followed suit.

One of the lessons from this research is that an internal fighting severely undermines a state stability creating a field for the enemies to penetrate and destroy it. The shattering of the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus, on the other hand, gives a tragically concrete lesson of foreign dissolution—the state fell to foreign victors, namely to the Christian monarchies.

### **The Challenge of Christian Kingdoms to Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's Rule in Al-Andalus**

The Islamic armies that embarked on the conquest of Al-Andalus advanced with remarkable speed, capturing one city after another until they reached the northern regions of Spain. Here, the challenging terrain, marked by rugged mountains and harsh weather conditions, led the military leaders and decision-makers to believe that the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula was complete. They assumed that all resistance had been eradicated and that the Islamic armies had successfully raised the banner of Islam over the entirety of Spain.

However, this assumption was far from reality. In the northern part of Spain, remnants of the Gothic forces and their fragmented army regrouped, taking advantage of the concealment provided by the rocky mountains to avoid detection by the advancing conquerors. One such group assembled in the Cantabrian highlands (Cantabria) in the region of Navarre (Basque Country) under the leadership of a figure known as Duke Pedro (or Petros). This group established a minor emirate in northeastern Navarre, also referred to as the Basque region. Despite its presence, this emirate posed little threat due to its location on the western periphery of the Pyrenees Mountains (referred to in Arabic sources as the Al-Bartat Mountains).

Consequently, it was frequently exposed to confrontations with Islamic armies during their campaigns into and out of Frankish territories.

The second and more significant group gathered in the northwestern corner of Spain, in the rugged terrain of Asturias—referred to in Arabic sources as *Jaliqiyya* (Galicia), derived from its original name, *Galicia*. This region was also known as the *Rock of Pelayo*, named after the leader of this resistance movement. These regrouped forces leveraged the natural fortifications provided by the terrain to mount a persistent challenge to the Islamic rule in Al-Andalus.

This text elucidates the strategic challenges faced by Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil and the Islamic armies in addressing the resistance mounted by these Christian forces in the northern regions of Spain. It highlights the complexities of maintaining control over newly conquered territories in the face of organized resistance rooted in geographically advantageous regions.

**One historian remarks about this period:**

“Musa and Tariq advanced with their contingents until they reached the elevated heights of Asturias in the Cantabrian Mountains. They reached an impassable and rugged summit, referred to by Muslim historians as *The Rock* or *The Rock of Pelayo*, located near the northern coast of Spain by the Bay of Biscay.” This region, which the Arabs did not prioritize for complete conquest, remained outside the realm of effective Islamic sovereignty. The scattered remnants of Gothic resistance consolidated under a leader named Pelagius (*Pelayo*), a figure from the Visigoths.

The conquering armies overlooked these remnants, either underestimating their significance or due to the difficulty of pursuing them through the mountain passes and caves. The cold climate, the rugged terrain, and the subsequent recall of the victorious commanders Musa and Tariq to Damascus by the Caliph al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik were among the reasons for the inability to fully eliminate these groups. In secrecy and silence, this region became the cradle of a nascent Christian state in northern Spain. The Muslims neither noticed its emergence nor its early growth, and even when they became aware of it, they underestimated its importance. Their indifference persisted until it grew into a force capable of aggression.

Pelagius (*Pelayo*) organized these groups despite the immense challenges he faced, instilling courage and determination among his followers. Ibn Adhari recounts the exploits of the Muslim governor, Uqba ibn al-Hajjaj al-Saluli:

“He conquered Galicia and Pamplona, settling Muslims in these territories. His conquests encompassed the entirety of Galicia, with the exception of *The Rock*, where the King of Galicia had sought refuge with 300 foot soldiers.”

This marked the beginning of a protracted struggle, as the Muslims initially disregarded this emerging resistance but later faced its escalating threat as it developed into a structured and formidable opposition.

The Muslims besieged the remnants of the Christian resistance until their numbers dwindled to just thirty men. Their provisions were depleted, and they survived solely on honey found in crevices within the rock. Despite their efforts, the Muslim forces eventually grew weary of the situation and abandoned the siege. One account states:

“They remained confined in Galicia, with every village conquered except for *The Rock*, where a king named Pelayo sought refuge with 300 foot soldiers. The Muslims continued to fight and besiege them until hunger claimed the lives of many among them. Some of their group surrendered, while others gradually perished, leaving only thirty men and fewer than ten women. The Muslims, fatigued by their persistence, dismissed them, saying, 'What threat could thirty individuals pose?' and underestimated their significance.”

The Muslim governor, despite his valor and determination, could not annihilate the remaining Christian forces. Pelayo and his companions continued to resist, exploiting every opportunity and favorable circumstance to strengthen their position. Over time, this small group grew in numbers and fortified its influence.

Ultimately, the Muslim conquerors acknowledged the existence of these Christian enclaves in the north, leaving them confined to their rugged and inhospitable terrain. They regarded this situation as an unavoidable evil, convinced that reclaiming these territories from the Spaniards would cost more Islamic lives than it was worth. However, this estimation proved to be a grave misjudgment.

Before long, the Christian resistance grew in strength and power, further exacerbated by internal conflicts within the Muslim ranks. Tribal disputes among the Arabs, as well as tensions between Arab and Berber factions—the two dominant elements of the Islamic army—further weakened the unity and effectiveness of the Muslim forces, enabling the Christian enclaves to consolidate and pose a significant challenge in the years that followed.

The Islamic conquest experienced significant setbacks as a substantial number of soldiers perished in battle, and large contingents of Berbers, who were a crucial support to their Arab counterparts in resisting and restraining the enemy, were lost.

When Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil arrived, he decisively reclaimed Al-Andalus from the control of Al-Fihri and established an Umayyad emirate. He unified the territory and resolved the entrenched divisions among the Arabs and between the Arabs and Berbers. This unification enabled him to halt the Christian advance southward and prevent the annexation of Islamic

regions into the burgeoning Christian kingdom, which had been steadily expanding prior to his arrival. Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil consolidated the fragmented Islamic forces and organized a structured resistance against Christian incursions. The Duero River (*Nahr al-Duwayra*) became a natural barrier between the Muslims and the Christians in the north, along which a series of Islamic border fortifications and permanent military outposts were established, serving as both defensive and offensive strongholds.

During this period, Fruela I passed away, leaving his brother Alfonso to rule the entire Christian kingdom. However, Alfonso's reign was brief, as he died a year later in 140 AH/757 CE, transferring the leadership of the kingdom to Fruela's son, Fruela I.

Emir Abd al-Rahman turned his attention to suppressing the many revolts that broke out against his rule. These uprisings sapped his energy and resources, as the number of insurgents and the tempo of their revolts grew. Aware of this predicament, the Christian king Fruela I would soon seize the opportunity for an attack. He assumed that Abd al-Rahman was not even capable of mounting significant military expeditions outside his emirate's borders. Exploiting this image, Fruela I attacked Islamic lands, penetrated the Duero River and snatched extensive territories and a number of cities, adding them to his domain.

The Muslim fortifications of the Islamic frontier were aggressively targeted by Musa I in 140 AH/757 CE, who forced the Muslims back and seized important strongholds and bases, including key cities. This was a pivotal moment in a long-standing conflict between the Islamic emirate and the Christian kingdoms.

Over this time cities like Bértola, Zamora, Castilla, and Segovia, fell into the hands of the Galicians (Christians forces). They held these territories until the end of the Umayyad state where they would be reconquered by Al-Mansur Ibn Abi Amir. These losses were a significant blow to the Islamic state in Al-Andalus.

Meanwhile, the state was rife with revolts, internal conflict, and insurgencies against Emir Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil. His efforts were fully absorbed by these challenges, so he turned to subduing rebellions and stabilising the budding Umayyad emirate. In this context, Abd al-Rahman was pleased to make a peace treaty with the Christian powers of northern Spain. This was a mutually guaranteeing treaty, good for five years, within which the northern Christians promised money and arms to the government in Córdoba out of appeasement. The treaty was ratified in Safar 142 AH/759 CE.

**The text of the treaty reads:**

**"In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. This is a document of safety, mercy, and the preservation of lives and sanctity, established by the noble Emir,**

**the esteemed King Abd al-Rahman ibn Mu'awiya, distinguished by honor and abundant virtue, for the patriarchs, monks, and their followers."**

This agreement reflects the strategic acumen of Abd al-Rahman, who, despite external threats, prioritized the stability and development of his emirate while ensuring temporary security against northern Christian forces.

The agreement stipulated specific terms for the people of Castile and its territories, contingent on their continued compliance and loyalty in fulfilling their obligations. Emir Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil explicitly declared that his covenant would remain in effect as long as they adhered to the annual payment of **ten thousand ounces of gold, ten thousand pounds of silver, ten thousand of the finest horses, and an equal number of mules**. Additionally, they were required to supply **one thousand shields, one thousand helmets, and an equal number of spears**. Should any breach occur—whether by capturing prisoners or violating the rights of a Muslim—the agreement would be considered null and void.

The treaty was to remain valid for five years, as recorded in Safar 142 AH (759 CE), and was signed with their acknowledgment and consent. The document states:

**"In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. This is a treaty of security and peace granted by the great king, Abd al-Rahman, to the patriarchs, monks, nobles, Christians, Andalusians, and the people of Castile, as well as those who follow them from other lands. It is a document of peace and security, with the Emir himself testifying that this covenant shall not be invalidated as long as they fulfill their obligations annually: ten thousand ounces of gold, ten thousand pounds of silver, ten thousand of the finest horses and mules, along with one thousand shields, one thousand helmets, and an equal number of spears. The covenant shall remain in effect for five years. Signed in the city of Córdoba, 3 Safar 142 AH."**

Professor Anan Nasr documented a version of this agreement with minor textual differences. His rendition reads:

**"In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. This is a treaty of security and peace granted by the great king, Abd al-Rahman, to the patriarchs, monks, nobles, Christians, and Andalusians, and the people of Castile and those who follow them from other lands. It is a document of peace and security, with the Emir himself testifying that his covenant shall not be invalidated as long as they fulfill their obligations: ten thousand ounces of gold, ten thousand pounds of silver, ten thousand of the finest horses and mules, along with one thousand shields, one thousand helmets, and an equal number**

**of spears annually. The treaty is valid for five years and was signed in the city of Córdoba on 3 Safar 142 AH."**

Several scholars and historians have commented on this agreement, including Dr. Al-Sufi, who mentions:

**"One of the Arab writers, Ahmad al-Nahhas al-Dumyati, provided the text of the treaty..."**

**In a footnote, he adds:**

**"We were unable to obtain the complete text of this document..."**

This treaty exemplifies the political acumen of Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil in securing temporary peace with his adversaries while consolidating the foundations of the Umayyad emirate in Al-Andalus. The detailed terms reflect a strategic effort to balance the demands of internal governance and external threats.

The exact text of the treaty, as recorded in the original source, is unavailable, compelling reliance on secondary sources. One such source is the respected French historian Évariste Lévi-Provençal, who discusses this treaty in his seminal work, *History of Islamic Spain* (vol. 4, p. 77).

Other references note that during the reign of Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil, some modern sources mention the existence of an agreement between him and the people of Castile, signed in 142 AH (759 CE) and valid for five years.

Dr. Abd al-Rahman Al-Hajji provides the text of the treaty, citing the same source referenced by Professor Anan: the historian Ghazīrī. Al-Hajji also acknowledges Anan's contributions. He further recounts his efforts to locate the treaty's text, describing a visit to the El Escorial Library, where he examined two manuscripts of *Al-Ihata* by Ibn al-Khatib (Manuscript No. 1673, p. 239, and Manuscript No. 1674, p. 139). Despite his thorough search, he was unable to find the treaty's text within these manuscripts.

**Al-Hajji raises a pertinent question:**

**"Could the treaty have originally been included in Ibn al-Khatib's *Al-Ihata* but later lost? If so, it might be part of the collection known as *Legajos*—a compilation of scattered documents brought together."**

**He further speculates:**

**"Did Professor Anan and the French orientalist Lévi-Provençal personally access this text in *Al-Ihata*? This seems unlikely, as neither provides specific page references. Furthermore, Lévi-Provençal asserts that the text is mentioned in the book *Mashari' al-Aswaq*, authored by Ahmad al-Nahhas al-Dumyati. This text is said to be included in**

**Chapter 32, but it is absent from the Bulaq edition of the book. However, it is present in..."**

This critical analysis reflects the challenges of relying on historical manuscripts, where incomplete records and potential losses complicate the retrieval of original sources. The question of whether the treaty was accessible to earlier historians or derived from alternative compilations remains unresolved, emphasizing the need for meticulous examination of historical texts and archives.

The manuscript in question, which lacks specific reference to its number or location, has been a source of much scholarly speculation. Dr. Al-Hajji remarks:

**"It is possible that those who claimed the treaty text was included in *Al-Ihata* did so after consulting Ghazīrī's catalog. This catalog mentions *Al-Ihata* when discussing its manuscripts and citing excerpts from them, leading to the assumption that the treaty text must be within its pages."**

He further elaborates:

**"From my understanding, Ghazīrī referenced a statement by Ibn al-Khatib concerning Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil. Ghazīrī, incidentally, provided the text of the treaty concluded by Abd al-Rahman with the northern Christian forces. However, he attributes this treaty to a work by Al-Razi (Ahmad ibn Muhammad), which he identified under its Latinized title *Bello Hispano* ('The Battle of Spain'). It is plausible that this text referred to the conquest of Al-Andalus. Unfortunately, like many other works by Al-Razi, this book has been lost along with much of our heritage."**

After reviewing the literature surrounding the treaty's text and the confusion among scholars regarding its existence, coupled with its direct relevance to this research, I was compelled to make every possible effort to uncover what others had not. I examined numerous manuscripts and printed works, particularly those by Ibn al-Khatib, whether in manuscript or published form. My primary focus was on *Al-Ihata fi Akhbar Gharnata* in its four printed volumes, edited by Professor Anan. Despite meticulous scrutiny, I found no evidence shedding light on the treaty text.

Undeterred, I continued my search through our rich historical legacy and, after considerable effort, succeeded in locating the text of the treaty. It was found in a manuscript of *Siyar A'lam al-Nubala'* by Al-Dhahabi, housed at the Egyptian National Library under reference number (J12195), Volume 6, Page 211. This discovery effectively resolved the longstanding uncertainty faced by many writers and historians who had previously addressed this subject.



This effort underscores the challenges of reconstructing historical narratives from scattered and often incomplete sources while emphasizing the importance of persistence in uncovering critical pieces of lost heritage.

Returning to the treaty signed in 142 AH/759 CE, it becomes evident that the ruler of the northern Christian principalities at that time was Fruela I (140–151 AH/757–768 CE). Fruela was renowned for his significant victories, including the conquest of vast Islamic territories in the north, which he subsequently annexed to his Christian kingdom. This raises the critical question: what compelled him to accept the terms of this treaty, including the payment of substantial sums to the government in Córdoba?

The answer lies in several factors. First, Emir Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's decisive and ruthless suppression of rebellions within Al-Andalus instilled fear among the northern Christians. Fruela and his court recognized the Emir's formidable strength and sought to secure peace with him, hoping to avoid confrontation with the powerful Islamic state.

Second, Fruela himself was a tyrant known for his harsh and oppressive rule. His severe methods of suppressing numerous revolts in northern Christian Spain earned him widespread enmity among his subjects. This internal unrest ultimately led to his assassination by one of the rebels. Faced with mounting internal challenges, Fruela sought to ensure the security of his kingdom's southern borders by negotiating the treaty, allowing him to focus on quelling domestic dissent. Similarly, the treaty enabled Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil to concentrate on eradicating the remaining rebellions within his emirate, which he systematically subdued one by one.

Despite these temporary agreements, Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil continued to view the northern Christian territories as a persistent threat. Whenever an opportunity arose, he dispatched military expeditions to engage the enemy. In 148 AH/765 CE, he sent a large army under the command of one of his generals to the borders of Galicia. This campaign resulted in significant clashes with the Christians and rebels, culminating in victories for the Islamic forces. The army returned to Córdoba laden with spoils and prisoners.

In 150 AH/768 CE, Abd al-Rahman assembled another army, appointing his trusted servant Badr as its commander. This force advanced into northern Christian territory, penetrating beyond...

(Here, the narrative may continue to describe the outcomes of this expedition and its strategic implications.)

This sequence of events underscores Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's relentless efforts to consolidate his rule internally while maintaining a proactive stance against external threats. It

also reflects the complex dynamics of power, diplomacy, and military strategy in the early Umayyad emirate of Al-Andalus.

The army advanced into the region, engaged its inhabitants in battle, emerged victorious, and imposed the payment of *jizya* (a tax) on them. Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil carefully scrutinized the loyalty of Muslim leaders in the frontier regions, seeking to uncover any hidden intentions or disloyalty. Those whose allegiance to the Umayyad Emirate was suspect were taken back to Córdoba for further evaluation.

However, these military campaigns did not yield decisive victories, nor did they significantly weaken the Christian presence in the north or eliminate their foothold.

The assassination of Fruela I, while his son was still a young child, led to the division of the Christian kingdom into two separate entities. The eastern section, Navarre (*Alba*), selected Aurelio (also spelled Aurelios or Orrelios), son of Fruela's brother Alfonso I, as their ruler, as his father had previously governed this region. The western section, Galicia (*Galicia*), came under the rule of Silo, who was married to Adosinda (*Adoninda*), the daughter of Alfonso I. Thus, the Christian territories in the north were divided into two kingdoms, each with its own ruler. Despite this division, the two regions maintained harmonious relations, with no conflicts or disputes arising between them.

In 165 AH/781 CE, Aurelio passed away, prompting the Basques (*Bashkuns*, referring to the people of Navarre) to choose Silo as his successor. The decision was influenced by the fact that Fruela's son, Alfonso, was still a child and incapable of assuming the responsibilities of governance. Consequently, the Christian kingdoms of the north were reunited under a single ruler.

This period reflects the fluid and dynamic nature of political power in the northern Christian territories during the early Islamic rule in Al-Andalus. The temporary division and subsequent reunification of the Christian kingdom underscore the role of familial ties and strategic alliances in maintaining stability and unity amidst internal and external challenges.

During these events, Arabic sources recount that Emir Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil led a significant military campaign to Zaragoza in 164 AH/780 CE to suppress a rebellion that had erupted there. From Zaragoza, he advanced to the land of the Basques (*Bashkir*), laying siege to the fortress of *Muthmin al-Aqra'* (the Bald). The fortress was stormed and captured by force. Abd al-Rahman then proceeded to *Muldathun ibn Talal* and besieged him in his stronghold. After fierce fighting in the surrounding mountainous terrain, the Emir captured the stronghold and destroyed it.

Following these decisive actions, Abd al-Rahman returned to Córdoba, having firmly reasserted the strength and authority of the Umayyad Emirate over Al-Andalus. His campaign not only consolidated Umayyad control over Andalusia but also, on occasion, imposed its influence and prestige on Christian northern Spain.

During this period, Silo continued to rule Galicia. His reign was marked by numerous revolts, and he eventually passed away in 168 AH/784 CE without leaving an heir. Before his death, Silo bequeathed the kingdom to a child, Alfonso, son of Fruela I, designating his wife, Princess Adosinda, as the regent. However, the nobility and much of the population rejected the idea of governance under a child and a woman. This dissatisfaction sparked violent uprisings, which ultimately resulted in the rise to power of a man named Mauregato (*Muraqat* in Islamic sources).

Mauregato seized control of western Galicia, with the support of nobles opposed to the child and the regency. He established his capital in Pravia, while the young Alfonso fled to Alava (*Albia*) to seek refuge and support from his maternal relatives, the Basques (*Bashkins*), who rallied to his cause for reclaiming the throne.

This epoch elucidates the interplay between power, internal opposition and shifting alliances between Muslim and Christian kingdoms in medieval Iberia. Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's firm measures preserved the integrity of the Umayyad commonwealth, whereas the haphazard Christian principalities of the north remained mired in succession crisis and political strife.

In this context of political crisis and internal division in Christian Spain and among its northern kingdoms, the governor of Toledo, who was loyal to Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil, undertook a campaign into Christian-ruled territories to the north in 168 AH/784 CE. As a result, numerous Muslim victories over Christian forces were registered from this campaign, and the campaign concluded with Muslim forces returning to Córdoba carrying significant spoils and prisoners.

To cement his position, Mauregato (*Muraqat* in Muslim sources) allied himself with the Muslims, to win their favor and safety from his possible hostilities. Alfonso, therefore, and his clients countered Mauregato's alliance with the Umayyad emirate by forming their own alliance with the Franks, the Muslim enemy. The *da'wa* would appear to have worked, because for the rest of Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's reign there are no major hostilities with the northern Christian kingdoms.

Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil and his successors did not completely eradicate the Christian presence in northern Spain. Until the establishment of Al-Andalus, the Christians were near

the borders of Al-Andalus, whenever an opportunity arises, they razed the land. Sometimes they won and at other times they lost. Eventually, this led to the eventual expulsion of Muslims from Al-Andalus in centuries to come.

This period in history is also characterized by the strategic savviness of the northern Christian kingdoms given that they exploit alliances and changing geopolitics in a continued effort to liberate Iberia from Muslim rule. It further illustrates the difficulties that the Umayyad monarchs encountered in sustaining their power over the Iberian Peninsula through internal and external forces.

## **2. CONCLUSION:**

ADammous' detailed analysis of Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil's attitude toward the Christian kingdoms of northern Spain also illustrates how the Emir was incapable of mounting large-scale military campaigns similar to those of his earlier governors. This limitation was due to the multiple revolts that plagued his reign and the entirety of his reign was spent stamping out these insurgencies. His authority could not be asserted on a series of persistent rebellions, and he had little room to pay attention to the northern regions of the Iberian Peninsula.

Additionally, after the Umayyad Emirate in Al-Andalus broke away from the Islamic Caliphate, its resources were rather limited. This political and administrative separate nature restricted the emirate from the huge wealth, reinforcements and logistical support provided by the caliphal administration. Thus Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil found himself limited to his emirate's reduced capabilities, making any large scale campaign against the northern Christian kingdoms impossible.

Abd al-Rahman's attitude toward the Christian north was thus a product of internal conditions in his emirate, the imperative of stabilizing his rule, and the very limited resources available to him. His pragmatic approach was a fine balancing of priorities that ensured the establishment and survival of Umayyad power in Al-Andalus in the face of complex internal and foreign threats.

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