

Algorithmic Ijtihad and the Digital Dhimmah: Reconstructing Legal Agency in Islamic Law

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Abstract: With the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) systems have introduced a new legal reality that challenges the classical *fiqh* theory of *dhimmah*, which is grounded in the human attributes of reason, intention, and moral consciousness. This study aims to determine the ontological and functional status of AI systems within Islamic law and to propose a model of “constructive” or “digital *dhimmah*,” derived from the juristic method of *istihsan*, in order to address the emerging responsibility gap caused by autonomous actions. The research adopts a qualitative and normative-analytical methodology, surveying the relevant literature between 2010 and 2025 within a PRISMA-based framework, and examining the performance of AI models in Islamic inheritance calculations through selected case studies. The findings indicate that, ontologically, AI constitutes a form of *techne*, that is, an artificial artifact, yet functionally exhibits a limited appearance of a “quasi-agent.” Logical inconsistencies and hallucinated outputs observed in inheritance law tests demonstrate that AI lacks the capacity to comprehend revealed texts and to conduct genuine juristic reasoning. Accordingly, the study argues that AI should not be regarded as an independent *mujtahid*, but rather as a research assistant operating under human supervision. Ultimate moral and legal responsibility must, in all circumstances, revert to the human bearer of *dhimmah*, while technological governance should be regulated in accordance with the higher objectives of the law (*maqasid*), particularly the preservation of life, intellect, and property.

Keywords: Algorithmic Ijtihad; Artificial Intelligence; Digital Dhimmah; Islamic Law; Legal Agency.

1. Introduction

With the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, digital technologies have initiated a process of transformation that is qualitatively different from previous periods in human history (Sipahi, 2022a). Until the eve of the third millennium, societies largely operated within a relatively simple world shaped by mechanical tools of limited scope. Today, however, a new social structure has emerged in which digitalization, the internet, and mobile technologies permeate almost every aspect of daily life (Acar & Gezer, 2025). In particular, AI systems based on machine learning, deep learning, and big data analytics have evolved beyond passive automation tools. They now function as systems capable of perceiving environmental data, executing reasoning processes, and making autonomous decisions that lead to digital or physical actions (Demir, 2024). The European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence defines such systems as software structures that interpret data in pursuit of complex objectives and adapt their behavior according to the surrounding environment (Hansenberger, 2018). In contemporary society, AI has become a technological actor that not only supports human labor but also generates new possibilities across diverse sectors, including healthcare, finance, manufacturing, logistics, and law (Acar & Gezer, 2025; Taş, 2022).

From the perspective of Islamic law, this technological transformation gives rise to new and comprehensive issues that must be addressed within the framework of jurisprudence of unprecedented cases (*fiqh al-nawāzil*) (Oğurlu, 2024). The historical development of *fiqh*

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demonstrates that it possesses a dynamic internal structure capable of adapting to social change (Justaniah, 2024). Consequently, the phenomenon of artificial intelligence emerges as a new legal problem that must be evaluated within the principles of classical legal theory (Sipahi, 2022a; Oğurlu, 2024). Yet AI is not merely a new technical instrument; it also challenges the traditional understanding of the “agent” and the “legal subject” in Islamic jurisprudence (Sudirman et al., 2025). In classical fiqh thought, legal subjectivity is grounded in the notion of dhimmah, which is associated with biological life, consciousness, intention, and moral responsibility (Acar & Gezer, 2025). Although AI may display human-like behavior, it lacks a soul, conscience, and genuine intention (Görgülü & Kesgin, 2021). This situation raises a fundamental question regarding the legal status of actions carried out in digital environments (Sipahi, 2025).

The examination of artificial intelligence within Islamic law is motivated by several fundamental concerns. The first is the problem commonly described in the literature as the “responsibility gap” (Okur, 2025). When an autonomous system causes harm or produces a legally consequential decision, the question of who bears responsibility becomes a central issue in both modern legal systems and Islamic jurisprudence (Demir, 2024). The traditional fiqh conception of an “instrument” or “tool” may prove insufficient to explain the responsibility of systems capable of making independent decisions (Altun, 2023). The second concern relates to the role of artificial intelligence in fatwa production and processes of religious authority (Çelik, 2024). While large language models offer significant advantages in rapidly processing juristic literature, algorithmic errors and the inability to grasp context pose serious risks to the reliability of religious knowledge (Yıldız, 2024; Okur, 2025). The third concern involves the governance of autonomous systems in relation to the fundamental objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣ id al-sharī‘a). Artificial intelligence may be regarded as legitimate to the extent that it serves social benefit; however, it must be subject to legal limitations whenever it conflicts with justice, privacy, or human dignity (Oğurlu, 2024). In this respect, it is crucial for Muslim societies to engage with technological developments not merely as passive users, but as active agents shaping the legal and ethical frameworks governing these technologies (Rahman, 2025).

The literature addressing the relationship between artificial intelligence and law generally reflects four principal approaches. The first adopts an ontological perspective. Acar and Gezer (2025), drawing on the Aristotelian distinction between *technē* and *physis*, argue that artificial intelligence can never attain full legal capacity. In their view, AI remains a mimetic structure, lacking the human attributes of soul and dhimmah. Sipahi (2022b), by contrast, characterizes AI as a “digital entity” and contends that it should be evaluated within the virtual sphere as a new legal domain.

The second approach focuses on models of responsibility. Altun (2023) explains artificial intelligence through the classical fiqh analogy of a “trained animal,” arguing that responsibility should ultimately revert to the system owner or user. Demir (2024), on the other hand, proposes granting AI a limited form of “constructive legal personality,” drawing analogies with institutions such as waqfs and corporations. In contrast, Görgülü and Kesgin (2021) maintain that attributing legal personality to machines may produce consequences incompatible with human dignity and the Islamic conception of the human being.

The third approach adopts a methodological and teleological perspective. Oğurlu (2024) analyzes artificial intelligence through purposive interpretation, arguing that technologies that enhance social welfare are legitimate, whereas systems that produce harm must be restricted. Sipahi (2022a) further suggests that the method of *istihsān* may offer more flexible and equitable solutions to the complex issues generated by artificial intelligence.

The fourth approach concentrates on technical and empirical adequacy. Okur (2025) demonstrates that large language models produce serious logical errors in inheritance law calculations, concluding that such systems cannot be regarded as independent mujtahids or muftis. Similarly, Sudirman and colleagues emphasize the need for institutional policy frameworks on artificial intelligence ethics within Muslim societies (Sudirman et al., 2025).

Although the existing literature offers significant contributions regarding the ontological status of artificial intelligence, responsibility models, and maqāṣ id-based legitimacy frameworks, it also reveals the absence of a comprehensive model that synthesizes classical principles of legal theory with contemporary technological realities (Sipahi, 2022b). In particular, the reinterpretation of concepts such as dhimmah, legal capacity, and responsibility in the context of autonomous systems constitutes an important field of both theoretical and practical inquiry (Demir, 2024).

This study aims to determine the ontological and functional position of artificial intelligence systems within Islamic law and to address the responsibility gap arising from autonomous actions by synthesizing the classical heritage of legal theory with contemporary technological realities. In this context, the study examines the place of artificial intelligence within the concepts of legal capacity and dhimmah, evaluates the limits of classical analogical models, and explores the possibility of a model of “constructive” or “digital dhimmah” grounded in istihsān. The ultimate objective is to present a coherent legal framework for AI governance in accordance with the principles of maqāṣ id al-sharīʿa.

2. Results

The findings of this study, which aims to determine the position of artificial intelligence within Islamic law, indicate that classical juristic categories possess both limitations and transformative potential in interpreting modern technological entities. The results are organized around five principal axes: the ontological status of artificial intelligence, the theory of legal capacity and dhimmah, classical analogies, algorithmic ijtihād, and finally a normative framework centered on istihsān and maqāṣ id.

Ontological Status of Artificial Intelligence: Between Techne and the Digital Entity

The first step in determining the position of artificial intelligence (AI) within Islamic law is to identify its place in the hierarchy of being. Classical Islamic thought, following an Aristotelian ontological framework, divides existence into two main categories: the natural (physis) and the artificial (techne) (Acar & Gezer, 2022). Natural entities possess an intrinsic principle of movement and development, whereas artificial entities are the products of human will and intelligence, resulting from external design and intervention (Acar & Gezer, 2025). In this respect, AI systems, regardless of the complexity of their algorithms, fundamentally consist of software and hardware components designed by humans (Acar & Gezer, 2022). Ontologically, therefore, AI must be situated within the category of techne (Acar & Gezer, 2025).

As emphasized by Acar and Gezer (2022), “not everything that behaves like a human is a form of human.” This observation clarifies the distinction between simulation capacity and ontological reality (Tarlacı, 2019; Acar & Gezer, 2022). In Islamic jurisprudence, what renders the human being a complete legal subject is not merely cognitive capacity or behavioral patterns, but rather the metaphysical attribute of dhimmah associated with soul, consciousness, and primordial covenant (al-Bukhārī). From this perspective, artificial intelligence lacks the metaphysical foundation that constitutes human legal subjectivity, making it impossible to treat AI as a full legal subject in the classical sense (Acar & Gezer, 2025; Görgülü & Kesgin, 2021).

Nevertheless, reducing advanced AI systems to the category of ordinary inanimate objects would ignore technological reality (Sipahi, 2022b). These systems differ from classical objects in their functional capacities, such as data processing, decision-making, and environmental interaction (Demir, 2024). Sipahi (2022b) therefore proposes that AI should be regarded as a “digital entity” operating within a virtual domain, performing what he terms “digital acts.” This approach suggests that, although AI remains physically an object (māl), it exhibits a form of limited or quasi-agency at the functional level.

The resulting conclusion is that artificial intelligence is ontologically a techne, yet functionally a digital entity possessing limited agency (Sipahi, 2022b). This intermediate position preserves the human-centered structure of Islamic law while allowing the legal

system to incorporate new domains of responsibility produced by technological transformation (Oğurlu, 2024). AI is thus neither equated with human legal subjects nor reduced to passive objects; rather, it is positioned within a distinct category of digital entities that do not eliminate ultimate human responsibility (Sipahi, 2022b; Altun, 2023).

This ontological placement provides the theoretical foundation for subsequent discussions on dhimmah, legal capacity, and responsibility (Demir, 2024), since the legal status of any entity depends primarily on its correct placement within the hierarchy of being (Acar & Gezer, 2025).

Legal Capacity and the Theory of Dhimmah: The Possibility of Digital Dhimmah

One of the most original contributions that Islamic law can offer to the issue of artificial intelligence lies in the theoretical flexibility of the concept of dhimmah (Almajid, 2010). Whereas legal personality in modern legal systems is often defined through positive norms, dhimmah in Islamic law represents a multilayered structure encompassing both metaphysical and normative dimensions (Kaya & Hacak, 2013).

In classical juristic literature, dhimmah is defined as a legal receptacle that enables a person to bear rights and obligations (al-Sarakhsī, 2012; al-Jaṣṣ, 2010). This definition indicates that dhimmah cannot be reduced to a biological body; rather, it possesses a constructive and abstract character (Demir, 2024). This constructive nature provides the theoretical basis for recognizing legal status in non-biological entities.

Legal capacity (ahliyyah) in classical fiqh is divided into two forms: capacity for rights (ahliyyat al-wujūb) and capacity for execution (ahliyyat al-adā') (Acar & Gezer, 2025). Full capacity for execution requires intellect and maturity (Altun, 2023). Since artificial intelligence lacks biological development and metaphysical will, it cannot be considered a morally responsible subject in the classical sense (Sudirman et al., 2025). However, not every bearer of dhimmah in Islamic law possesses full legal capacity. Children, the mentally impaired, and juridical entities are recognized as holders of dhimmah within limited frameworks of capacity (Demir, 2024).

Historical examples such as waqfs and the public treasury (bayt al-māl), where dhimmah was extended to non-human structures, demonstrate that dhimmah is not strictly dependent on biological intellect but can function as a constructive legal structure (Sipahi, 2022a). These precedents suggest the possibility of developing a similar legal model for autonomous systems such as artificial intelligence.

Ustahaliloğlu (2022) argues that the most reasonable solution for advanced AI systems is to grant them a form of “digital personality” or “constructive dhimmah.” This proposal does not aim to grant human rights to artificial intelligence; rather, it seeks to establish a legal framework in which the obligations and liabilities arising from autonomous actions can be recorded. In this way, the responsibility gap may be addressed while maintaining consistency with principles of justice.

Classical Fiqh Analogies: Determining the Intermediate Position

The findings indicate that artificial intelligence does not fully conform to the classical subject–object distinction in fiqh. Its capacities for autonomous learning, behavioral updating, and unpredictable outcomes place it in a hybrid or liminal legal position (Sipahi, 2022b). Autonomous AI systems challenge the traditional human–object dichotomy, as they can neither be regarded as entirely passive tools nor as humans possessing metaphysical will (Görgülü & Kesgin, 2021; Altun, 2023; Demir, 2024). Consequently, classical analogies provide important theoretical instruments for interpreting the legal status of AI.

Three principal analogies emerge in the literature: the animal analogy, the slave analogy, and the agent analogy.

The Animal Analogy and Owner Responsibility

The animal analogy is among the most frequently invoked models for understanding the autonomous movements of AI. In classical fiqh, the owner of an animal is liable for the harm it causes only when negligence or fault can be established (al-Kāsānī, 1986). This model may

be applied to situations such as accidents involving autonomous vehicles. If the user fails to update the system or deploys it in a risky environment, responsibility reverts to the owner.

However, an important difference exists between animals and artificial intelligence. Animals possess a limited form of volition rooted in biological instinct, whereas AI operates entirely through algorithmic processes. Therefore, artificial intelligence cannot be said to possess genuine will; all its actions are the outcomes of software design and datasets.

The Slave Analogy and Limited Agency

The slave analogy attempts to explain the dual nature of artificial intelligence as both an economic asset and an entity displaying limited agency (Konertz & Schönhof, 20209). In classical fiqh, a slave authorized to engage in trade acquires a limited form of dhimmah and agency despite remaining a property. This structure resembles the proposed model of digital dhimmah for artificial intelligence.

However, this analogy remains limited due to its implications for human dignity and because artificial intelligence lacks any potential for emancipation or moral autonomy. For these reasons, the analogy serves only as a partial explanatory model.

The Agent Analogy and the Problem of Representation

The agent (wakīl) analogy is particularly relevant in financial and e-commerce contexts. Simple algorithms function as passive messengers, while autonomous financial systems approach the status of digital agents (Yurtseven, 2022). The primary issue in this model is the problem of exceeding authority. Liability arising from actions outside the given mandate ultimately reverts to the human who designed or deployed the system (Aybakan, 2013). As in classical agency relationships, responsibility ultimately returns to the human bearer of dhimmah (Poganitsch, 2019).

The Constructive Dhimmah Model

The findings indicate that no single analogy sufficiently explains the complex nature of artificial intelligence. The animal, slave, and agent analogies each capture certain aspects of AI, yet none fully accounts for the complexities produced by autonomous systems. To overcome this liminal position, scholars such as Demir (2024) and Sipahi (2022a) propose granting AI systems a form of “constructive” or “digital dhimmah,” analogous to the juridical structures of waqfs or the public treasury in Islamic law.

This proposal does not equate AI with human beings; rather, it aims to establish an abstract legal receptacle in which the rights and obligations arising from autonomous actions can be recorded. Thus, although AI remains physically an object (māl), the digital dhimmah allows it to function as a legal locus within juridical processes (Demir, 2024). In this manner, the responsibility gap is addressed while the coherence of the legal system is preserved.

Algorithmic Ijtihād and the Authority of Fatwa

Large language models have inaugurated a new phase in Islamic legal research by enabling the rapid scanning and synthesis of juristic literature. However, this technological capability has also introduced the concept of “algorithmic ijtihād” and raised the question of whether such systems can represent religious authority in the issuance of fatwas.

By its nature, ijtihād is not merely a process of textual retrieval; it is a profound intellectual effort that balances the literal wording, underlying meaning, and ultimate purpose (maqāṣ id) of scriptural sources. While AI attempts to simulate this process algorithmically, its lack of metaphysical qualities such as moral insight, piety, and intentionality calls into question its legal validity and authority (Çelik, 2024; Yıldız, 2024).

Empirical Failure: Inheritance Law Tests

Islamic inheritance law (farā’ id), which combines mathematical precision with binding scriptural rules, provides one of the most concrete domains for testing the juristic competence of artificial intelligence. An empirical study conducted by Hüseyin Okur (2025) on ChatGPT-4o and Google Gemini reveals significant limitations in these systems. Although both models

perform adequately in basic definitions, they commit serious errors in complex calculations and legal reasoning.

One of the most striking problems is the phenomenon of “algorithmic hallucination” (Justaniah, 2024). Instead of acknowledging uncertainty, AI systems may generate fabricated hadiths, incorrect Qur’ānic interpretations, or logically inconsistent juristic arguments (Çelik, 2024). For instance, the Gemini model produced contradictory examples in the case of ‘awl (proportional reduction when shares exceed the estate) and incorrectly granted inheritance shares to a grandchild while a living son was present, thereby violating established rules of exclusion (ḥajb). Such errors demonstrate that the system does not truly comprehend scriptural sources but merely arranges words according to statistical probabilities (Okur, 2025). These findings indicate that artificial intelligence cannot be regarded as an independent mujtahid.

Mufti or Assistant?

In Islamic law, issuing a fatwa entails declaring a ruling in the name of God and therefore requires not only knowledge but also moral responsibility and scholarly qualification. As emphasized by Çelik, AI systems possess neither intention nor susceptibility to moral or penal accountability, making it impossible to recognize them as independent muftis or mujtahids (Çelik, 2024).

The prevailing view among Muslim jurists is to position AI not as a decision-maker, but as a research assistant or intelligent advisory tool (Abdullah et al., 2024). AI can serve as a powerful instrument for tasks such as mapping linguistic transformations in large collections of fatwas, analyzing cross-school doctrinal similarities, and conducting juristic data mining (Seçkiner, 2022). However, the spiritual dimensions of ijtihād, such as moral insight, piety, and contextual awareness, cannot be transferred to machines (Acar & Gezer, 2025).

Expert assessments reported by Othman Abdullah and colleagues similarly conclude that AI may assist in understanding textual sources but can never replace human insight in grasping the objectives of the law or evaluating the consequences of legal rulings (Abdullah et al., 2024). Thus, algorithmic ijtihād should be understood as a technological support mechanism that reduces the research burden of the mujtahid. Every output produced by such systems remains a preliminary thesis requiring validation by a qualified jurist before attaining the status of a legitimate legal ruling.

A Normative Framework Centered on Istih̄sān and Maqāṣ id

The final finding of the study indicates that legal solutions concerning artificial intelligence cannot be developed solely through analogy-based reasoning, but must also incorporate teleological interpretation centered on istihsān and maqāṣ id (Oğurlu, 2024). This approach enables the construction of AI as a legal locus through the concept of constructive or digital dhimmah, while ensuring that such constructions remain subject to the higher objectives of the Sharī‘a (Demir, 2024).

Istih̄sān functions as a flexible legal preference mechanism that operates when strict analogy leads to unjust outcomes (Demir, 2024; Sipahi, 2022a). According to Sipahi (2022a), istihsān may function as a kind of “truth-function transformer” for the digital world. The binary logic of traditional analogy proves insufficient for the probabilistic and fuzzy-logic structures underlying AI systems. Just as fuzzy logic recognizes degrees of approximation between truth and falsehood, istihsān enables the jurist to evaluate subtle evidences in gray areas to reach the most equitable outcome (Sipahi, 2022a).

The responsibility gaps produced by autonomous AI actions can thus be addressed through the digital dhimmah model grounded in istihsān (Demir, 2024). Rather than equating AI with biological humans, this approach represents an exceptional legal solution, similar to waqf and corporate structures, designed to protect victims’ rights in the face of technological complexity.

As emphasized by Oğurlu (2024), the legitimacy of self-updating technologies such as AI must ultimately be evaluated within the framework of the *maqāṣ id al-sharī'a*. From this perspective, artificial intelligence should not be categorically rejected as a threat, but rather regarded as a lost property of humanity to be reclaimed and employed for the common good.

The governance of AI technologies within Islamic law can be structured around the five fundamental protections (*al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khams*) (Köse, 2022):

1. Protection of life (*ḥifẓ al-nafs*): Medical diagnostic algorithms and accident-reducing autonomous vehicles serve this objective, whereas uncontrolled autonomous weapons may threaten life and must therefore be restricted (Görgülü & Kesgin, 2021).
2. Protection of intellect (*ḥifẓ al-'aql*): AI systems that facilitate rapid access to knowledge contribute to intellectual development, while those that erode human reasoning capacity may constitute harm (Kafalı, 2022).
3. Protection of property (*ḥifẓ al-māl*): Applications such as robo-Sharī'a advisors in Islamic finance may help minimize risks of *ribā* and *gharar*, encouraging lawful investment (Yurtseven, 2022; Abdullah et al., 2024).
4. Protection of religion and lineage: Ensuring that algorithmic systems are free from biases, Islamophobia, and discrimination is essential for safeguarding justice and social morality (Sipahi, 2022a).

Ultimately, AI governance should be built upon the principles of public welfare (*maṣ laḥa*) and justice (*'adl*). Technologies that protect life, property, or lineage may be considered legitimate and even encouraged. Conversely, systems that violate privacy or produce injustice must be restricted or prohibited in accordance with the principle of blocking the means to harm (*sadd al-dharā'i'*) (Sudirman et al., 2025). This teleological approach enables Islamic law to balance technological efficiency with moral integrity and justice.

Taken as a whole, the findings demonstrate that artificial intelligence in Islamic law can be regarded neither as a mere object nor as a genuine person. The most coherent solution is to position AI within an intermediate category:

1. ontologically as *techne*,
2. functionally as a quasi-agent,
3. and legally as a bearer of constructive or digital *dhimma*.

This model preserves the human-centered moral order while offering a flexible legal framework capable of adapting to technological realities.

3. Discussion and Conclusion

This study set out to determine the ontological status, legal capacity, and liability regime of AI systems within Islamic law by developing the conceptual framework of a “digital or constructive *dhimma*.” The findings demonstrate that AI cannot be adequately classified within the classical dichotomy of “object” and “legal person.” Ontologically, AI remains a form of *techne*, lacking biological life, metaphysical soul, and moral intention. Functionally, however, its capacity for autonomous decision-making places it beyond the status of a passive instrument, giving rise to a limited form of quasi-agency. This hybrid character necessitates a middle-ground legal model rather than a strict extension of either classical subject or object categories.

Within the framework of the theory of *dhimma*, the study concludes that AI systems cannot possess full legal capacity in the classical sense. Nevertheless, drawing on historical institutional precedents such as *waqf* and *bayt al-māl*, it is possible to conceptualize a constructive legal container in which rights and liabilities arising from autonomous actions may be recorded. The proposed model of a “digital *dhimma*” thus offers a doctrinally grounded solution to the responsibility gap by linking the outcomes of autonomous systems to structured liability and compensation mechanisms.

Empirical observations from inheritance law experiments further reveal that, although AI can process textual rules mathematically, it fails to grasp the integrated structure of context, intention, and exception embedded in legal reasoning. Algorithmic hallucinations and logical inconsistencies indicate that computational capacity alone cannot constitute legal authority. Consequently, AI cannot be recognized as an independent mujtahid or muftī. Its proper role remains that of an advanced research and decision-support instrument operating under human scholarly supervision.

Normatively, the study establishes four guiding principles for AI governance within Islamic law. First, ultimate moral and legal responsibility remains human-centered; therefore, the consequences of autonomous systems must ultimately revert to human agents who design, deploy, or supervise them. Second, the digital dhimmah model, grounded in istiḥsān, enables the creation of compensation funds and structured liability regimes to address harms arising from autonomous decisions. Third, AI outputs cannot acquire the status of binding legal rulings without the review and endorsement of a qualified jurist; algorithmic results remain preliminary analytical inputs. Fourth, AI applications must be continuously assessed in light of the objectives of the Sharīʿa, and systems that threaten life, intellect, property, dignity, or privacy should be restricted in accordance with the principle of blocking the means to harm (sadd al-dharaʿiʿ).

Beyond these conclusions, the study contributes to the literature by proposing a coherent intermediate legal model that preserves the human-centered ethical structure of Islamic law while accommodating the functional realities of autonomous technologies. Rather than framing AI as either a legal subject or a mere object, the digital dhimmah model provides a doctrinally consistent framework that integrates classical legal theory with contemporary technological challenges.

Future research should explore several emerging directions. First, the legal nature of digital environments, conceptualized as an “E-homeland” or the locus of digital acts, requires systematic theoretical development. Second, interdisciplinary projects are needed to design ethically informed datasets that incorporate juristic virtues such as epistemic humility, precaution, and the principle of “I do not know” (lā adrī). Third, empirical studies evaluating AI performance across other legal domains, particularly criminal law and commercial transactions, would provide a more comprehensive assessment of its jurisprudential reliability. Finally, Muslim scholarly institutions should play an active role in shaping global AI standards by developing a maqāṣ id-oriented ethical framework for emerging technologies.

In sum, the adaptability of Islamic legal methodology demonstrates its capacity to address technological transformations without abandoning its normative foundations. While AI systems may offer significant technical benefits, the center of legal and moral authority remains the human bearer of dhimmah. Accordingly, AI should not be regarded as an independent legal authority, but rather as a supervised and ethically regulated instrument that operates within the objectives of the Sharīʿah. Only under the guidance of human moral consciousness can such technologies retain their character as genuine blessings rather than sources of harm.

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