

Research Article

The Necessary Objectives of the Law in Juristic Construction in Qadi Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi al-Maliki (d. 543/1148): An Inductive and Analytical Study of Ahkam al-Qur'an

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Abstract: This study examines the role of the necessary objectives of Islamic law (al-daruriyyat) in the juristic construction of Qadi Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi al-Maliki (d. 543/1148) in Ahkam al-Qur'an. Rather than merely identifying references to the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property, this study focuses on how these objectives function within juristic arguments. Using inductive and analytical methods, the study examines relevant passages from Ibn al-'Arabi's interpretation of legal verses, classifies them according to the five necessary objectives, and analyzes four functions: interpretive, causal, preferential, and consequential-preventive. The findings demonstrate that necessary objectives are active components in Ibn al-'Arabi's construction of legal rulings rather than supplementary moral explanations. Preservation of religion guides his interpretation of verses concerning fitna and coercion; preservation of life informs consequence-based reasoning regarding collective retaliation; preservation of intellect shapes his assessment of the benefits and harms of wine; preservation of lineage directs rulings on istibra' and paternity; and preservation of property supports debt documentation and loss prevention. The study concludes that Ibn al-'Arabi integrates textual evidence, linguistic analysis, transmitted reports, school doctrine, and purposive reasoning. His approach distinguishes between establishing objectives, validating rulings, and assessing their historical application within broader Islamic jurisprudential interpretive reasoning.

Keywords: Ahkam Al-Qur'an; Consequences of Acts; Juristic Construction; Preference; The Five Necessities.

1. Introduction

The exegesis of the verses of legal import is a field that reveals the nature of the relationship between the revealed text and juristic reasoning, for the jurist-exegete does not stop at explaining a word or the structure of a sentence but moves from signification to ruling, and from ruling to its operative cause and its consequences. In this movement the value of the objectives of the law is determined: do they remain general phrases about securing benefits and averting harms, or do they become instruments that discipline understanding, direct derivation, and prevent a particular ruling from colliding with the universals of the law? Ibn al-'Arabi's Ahkam al-Qur'an (Ibn al-'Arabi, 2003) is among the richest works permitting this question to be tested, given its author's command of exegesis, hadith, language, legal theory, law and judicial practice, and given the density of discussion, preference and grounding in principles that characterises the book (Muhyi al-Din and Zakariyya, 2020). Ibn al-'Arabi was not an author of purposive theory in the later technical sense established in independent works (Ibn Ashur, 2004), yet his juristic idiom and his practice reveal a clear presence of the notions of purpose, wisdom, benefit, rule, consequence, and the ordering of interests (Al-Tannani, 2015). This presence gains added importance where it concerns the five necessities, since they represent the highest level of interests upon which the order of religion and worldly life depends (Al-Ghazali, 1993; Al-Shatibi et al., 1997). Surveying their applications in Ahkam al-Qur'an is thus intended not merely to establish Ibn al-'Arabi's familiarity with terms current in the legal theory of his day, but to disclose the manner in which those universals entered the very fabric of the juristic ruling. The phrase 'juristic construction' in the title is deliberate: it is wider than 'derivation' and more precise than 'juristic position'. It denotes the sum of operations by which a ruling takes shape in Ibn al-'Arabi's work: determining the signification

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of the text, gathering the reports and opinions, framing the point at issue, disclosing the operative cause or wisdom, adjudicating among the opinions, observing the universal rules and the expected consequences, and finally formulating the juristic choice. On this basis the study regards the necessary objectives as a constructive component participating in these operations, not as a subsequent justification of them.

1. Research Problem and Questions

The problem lies in determining the place of the necessary objectives within the juristic process in Ibn al-'Arabi: are they conclusions extracted after the ruling has been settled, or premises and criteria entering into the understanding of the text, the justification of the ruling and the preference among opinions? The principal question is thus: how did the five necessities contribute to the construction of juristic rulings in Ibn al-'Arabi's *Ahkam al-Qur'an*? From it follow these questions:

What is meant by juristic construction in the context of Ibn al-'Arabi's exegesis, and what are its principal components?

In what forms do the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage and property appear in his exegesis of the verses of legal import?

Which argumentative functions did the necessary objectives perform: interpretation, justification, preference, and the consideration of consequences?

To what extent did Ibn al-'Arabi succeed in combining Maliki affiliation with purposive reasoning, and what are the limits of this combination?

2. Aims

The objectives of this study are to survey representative models of the necessary objectives in *Ahkam al-Qur'an* and to classify them functionally rather than merely thematically. The study also aims to analyse the effect of the necessary objective on the formation of juristic rulings, not merely on their ethical exposition. Furthermore, it seeks to highlight the relationship between the particular and the universal in Ibn al-'Arabi's method, as well as the role of rules and consequences in his preferences. Finally, the study aims to provide a scholarly evaluation that distinguishes the general methodological value of certain applications from rulings that are bound to their historical and juristic contexts.

3. Significance and Originality

The significance of the study lies in joining three fields often studied separately: the exegesis of the verses of legal import, Maliki legal theory, and the objectives of Islamic law. It also treats a scholar who practised adjudication, legal responsa and exegesis, so that his texts reveal the objectives at work within a real juristic dispute. Its originality lies not in asserting the presence of the objectives in Ibn al-'Arabi — several studies have preceded it in this (Anonymous, 2011) — but in shifting the analytical focus from the presence of the objectives to their functions; in constructing a fourfold functional reading model (interpretive, causal, preferential, consequential) tested upon the models; and in the evaluative distinction between the establishment of the objective, the soundness of the rule, and the accuracy of its application.

4. Previous Studies and the Position of this Research

Table 1. Previous Studies Related to the Research.

Study	Subject and relation to this research
"Purposive Exegesis in Ibn al-'Arabi," PhD dissertation, Yarmouk University (2011)	The study most closely related to the subject, tracing the purposive tendency in his exegesis generally. The present study differs in confining itself to the five necessities, in employing fourfold functional analysis rather than thematic survey, and in adding a level of critical evaluation of historical application.
Al-Tannani, "Ibn al-'Arabi's Innovations in the Field of the Objectives" (2012)	Highlighted his purposive distinction in general terms. The present study adds functional classification and the analysis of argumentative structure in each model.
Gharghadu, "Features of Purposive Qur'anic Exegesis in Ibn al-'Arabi" (2015)	Sketched the general features of purposive exegesis in his work. The present study goes deeper into the level of the necessities and their operation within preference and consequence.
Muhyi al-Din, "Aspects of Method" (2020); al-Badawi, "Ibn al-'Arabi al-Maliki and his Method" (2022)	Two studies of the book's general method (sources, presentation, discussion), forming the background upon which this study draws in describing the book, and which it goes beyond toward the functional question of the objectives.
Kambal, "Exegetical Sources"; Zulaykha and Tariyudi, "The Distinctive Method" (2023)	Treat the sources of the book and its distinctive method; the study benefits from them in establishing the book's characteristics without repeating their discussions.

The position of this study is determined by three matters: it is the first study — so far as the researcher is aware — to devote the five necessities alone to functional analysis in Ahkam al-Qur'an; it formulates a reading model open to testing and transferable to other works of the genre; and it maintains an evaluative level distinguishing objective, rule and application, so that it falls neither into unqualified celebration nor into contemporary projection.

5. Method and Sampling Criteria

The study adopts an inductive and analytical method: surveying indicative passages from the exegesis of the verses of legal import, and analysing the structure of the argument in each according to the fourfold functional model. The models were selected according to three criteria: that the model be explicit rather than merely possible in its connection with one of the five necessities; that an active argumentative function appear in it (interpretation, justification, preference or consequence) rather than a passing reference; and that each objective be represented by at least one central model whose structure is analysed in full, with reference to supporting passages. The limit of the study is that it does not claim to exhaust the passages of the objectives in the book — which number in the hundreds — but to build an explanatory model whose testing may be generalised.

6. Referencing Policy

References are given in footnotes numbered consecutively from (1) to the last number in the study; full bibliographic details appear at a source's first occurrence and an abbreviated form thereafter. The place of citation is given by what remains stable across editions: sura and verse for the commentaries, entry for the dictionaries, book for the hadith collections, and section or chapter for works of legal theory and objectives. The edition of Ahkam al-Qur'an relied upon is that of Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya with the annotations of M. 'Abd al-Qadir 'Ata (3rd ed., 1424/2003), from which the volume and page are to be supplied in the final redaction. The study also observes a strict rule of quotation: every text placed within quotation marks is attributed to the place verified by direct collation; and where a well-known text is one whose attribution overlaps among the works of the Ahkam al-Qur'an genre — as with the maxim concerning the rule and the wording in the question of killing a group for a single victim — it is attributed to its verified place and attention is drawn to the question of attribution in its proper context, so as to guard the study against a failing common in citation from these interrelated juristic commentaries.

Preliminary Section: Ibn al-'Arabi, his Book, and the Two Concepts

1. Qadi Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi

He is Abu Bakr Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah al-Ma'afiri al-Ishbili (468-543/1076-1148), a Maliki jurist, judge, traditionist and exegete of al-Andalus, who travelled to the East and met the leading scholars of his age (Ibn Farhun et al, 2000). His works — among them Qanun al-Ta'wil (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990a) and 'Aridat al-Ahwadhi (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990b)— attest to the breadth of his participation and the vigour of his presence in scholarly debate (Al-Badawi, 2022). His judicial career, moreover, gave him a sensitivity to the effects of rulings in practice, evident in his attention to consequences and to closing the avenues of evasion and encroachment. His Maliki affiliation was clear, and he often said 'our scholars hold' or 'the school of Malik'; yet this affiliation did not always prevent him from contesting the school or strengthening a contrary opinion when he found it more consonant with the evidence or with a governing rule (Al-Badawi, 2022; Muhyi al-Din and Zakariyya, 2020). His book cannot therefore be reduced to school apologetic; it is rather a critical defence in which text, report, language and the principles of derivation interweave. This feature helps explain how a purpose could, at times, operate as a criterion transcending the apparent sense of a particular term or a familiar school position.

2. The Characteristics of Ahkam al-Qur'an

Ibn al-'Arabi arranged his book by the suras of the Qur'an, mentioning the verses of legal import in each and dividing them into questions of varying number (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990a); his treatment usually includes the explanation of terms, the variant readings, the occasions of revelation, hadith and reports, the opinions of the jurists, and then discussion and preference (Zulaykha and Tariyudi, 2023). This arrangement turns the juristic question into a miniature unit in which several disciplines converge, and it permits one to trace the moment at which the author moves from signification to ruling. Among the book's features are the force of its expression and the frequency of its objections and discussions. Ibn al-'Arabi may be severe with his opponent, but that severity does not cancel the argumentative structure he employs, for he grounds his choices in a general term, an implication, a report, a rule, an interest or a consequence. The book combines exegesis by transmission with disciplined reasoning, and displays a clear presence of Maliki principles such as the practice of the people of Medina, consideration of benefit, the blocking of means, and regard for juristic difference in certain

places (Kambal, 2021). The value of the book for the subject of this study lies in the fact that the objective does not generally appear in an independent theoretical section but is distributed through the questions. Discovering it therefore requires surveying his functional vocabulary: 'safeguarding', 'preservation', 'observing the rule', 'benefit', 'necessity', 'need', 'consequence', 'were this door to be opened', and the like (Al-Tannani, 2012). These expressions are not equal in force, but together they trace a purposive network operating behind or within the ruling.

3. The Necessary Objectives and Juristic Construction: Clarifying the Two Concepts

The necessary objectives are those interests without which the order of religion and worldly life cannot stand, and whose disruption leads to general corruption or to the loss of the very foundation of religious and human life. Their classification became settled as the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage and property, with scholarly differences over the ordering of some of them or the addition of honour. This division was established by al-Ghazali in the discussion of appropriateness and benefit (Al-Ghazali, 1993), and reached its full elaboration with al-Shatibi, who held that the preservation of these universals proceeds both positively, by establishing their pillars, and negatively, by averting actual or expected disruption (Al-Shatibi, 1997). The necessities are therefore not confined to penalties but extend to worship, the family, transactions, documentation, prevention, and policies for the suppression of corruption (Al-Raysuni, 1995; Ibn Ashur, 1993; Al-Fasi, 1993). The importance of invoking this framework here is that Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 543 AH) precedes al-Shatibi by two centuries and is contemporary with the maturity of the Ghazalian school; the study of his applications thus discloses an intermediate link in the history of the idea before its full theoretical formulation. As for juristic construction, it is here the composite process producing the ruling or juristic choice, comprising five interconnected stages: understanding the text; determining the case; extracting the operative cause or wisdom; weighing and preferring; and assessing the consequence. An objective may operate at one stage or several: if it determines the meaning of 'fitna' it has an interpretive role; if it discloses that the documentation of a debt serves the preservation of property it has a causal role; if a rule is preferred over a possible literal reading it has a preferential role; and if an opinion is rejected because it opens the door to collusion in killing it has a consequential, preventive role. This definition requires distinguishing argument by the objective from argument for the objective: Ibn al-'Arabi may argue from a text to establish that the law preserves property — argument for the objective; and he may make the preservation of property a ground for understanding and confirming the command to document — argument by the objective. The more important for this study is the second, since it reveals the objective participating in the production of meaning and ruling.

Chapter One: The Purposive Foundations of Juristic Construction

1. Combining the Signification of the Text with its Universals

Purposive reasoning in Ibn al-'Arabi does not rest upon abolishing linguistic signification but upon placing it within a wider system of texts and rules. The Qur'anic term is the starting point, yet determining its scope may require the context of the verse, the verses of the field, the Sunna, Arabic usage and the general rules. Its clearest instance is the question of killing a group for a single victim: the objection that equivalence is a condition of retaliation and that there is no equivalence between one and many rests upon a purely numerical understanding of equivalence; and if equivalence were so understood, offenders could take collusion as a means of escape, and adopting that particular apparent sense would collide with the universal indicated by the text itself: 'in retaliation there is life for you' (Q. 2:179) (Ibn al-'Arabi, 2003). The objective thus turns from a general conclusion into a criterion for testing the validity of a particular understanding. Moreover, the universal in this context is not an external idea imposed upon the text but a meaning generated from the totality of the legislation: retaliation was prescribed for the protection of life, deterrence and justice (Al-Shatibi, 1997). This mechanism reveals a unity between exegesis and legal theory: the exegete explains the term; the theorist regulates the relations of general and particular, unqualified and qualified (Al-Ghazali, 1993); and the purposive thinker asks whether the outcome is consonant with the aim of the legislation. In Ibn al-'Arabi these levels do not always operate in sequence but interpenetrate within a single question — and this interpenetration is what gives Ahkam al-Qur'an its composite juristic character (Muhyi al-Din and Zakariyya, 2020).

2. Justification by Wisdom and Benefit

Ibn al-'Arabi frequently links rulings to meanings that explain their prescription, whether he calls them cause, wisdom, benefit or safeguarding. Justification here need not be a disciplined analogical cause with which rulings vary in presence and absence; it may be a disclosure of the aspect of the legislation or a statement of the ruling's appropriateness to a

general objective (Al-Ghazali, 1993). Among its instances are his justifying the condition of chastity and of *istibra'* by the safeguarding of licit seed against illicit (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990), and his justifying documentation by witnesses as preserving property (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990). The juristic value of this justification lies in linking the ruling to an ethical and social structure: *istibra'* is not an abstract temporal procedure but a means of preventing the confusion of lineages and safeguarding the rights arising from them; and writing and testimony are not procedural formalities but a fence protecting ownership and preventing dispute, forgetfulness and denial. Recently purposive justification remains for him disciplined by the authority of the text: he does not replace a legal ruling with a supposed benefit but extracts the aspect of benefit from the address or from the coherence of the rulings of the field (Al-Raysuni, 1993). This is an important point for contemporary appropriation of his method: the objective is no licence to override texts, but an instrument for understanding them, ordering their significations, and applying them in a manner that does not destroy what they intend.

3. Preference by Objective and Rule

Preference is the clearest field for the efficacy of the objectives in juristic construction, since disagreement confronts the jurist with several possibilities and he requires a criterion showing which is closest to the totality of the evidence. Ibn al-'Arabi may prefer by the stronger text, the sounder hadith or Arabic usage, and he may also prefer by a universal rule or a necessary interest (Al-Tannani, 2012). This does not make the objective an independent proof in every place, but it grants it a preferential function where significations are close or a corrupt outcome is feared: in retaliation the consequence of collective escape is invoked (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990); in the rules of lineage the safeguarding of paternity becomes a ground for prohibition until *istibra'* (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990); and in wine, benefit is not measured by immediate pleasure but by the balance of predominant harm (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990). It is to be observed that purposive preference operates in two directions: strengthening a ruling that protects a necessity, or restricting an application that might lead to its violation. The objectives cannot therefore be confined to facilitation or to severity: they may require alleviation in necessity for the preservation of life, firmness in retaliation for the same preservation, documentation of transactions for the preservation of property, and the restraint of the incompetent from disposal for the same end (Al-Fasi, 1993).

4. Consideration of Consequences and the Blocking of Avenues of Corruption

The consideration of consequences means that the jurist does not stop at the immediate form of an act but assesses what the ruling leads to under repeated application or evasive use. This spirit appears in Ibn al-'Arabi in formulations such as 'were people to know this, they would do that', or 'were this door to be opened it would lead to such and such' — an approach closes to the principle of blocking the means, which occupies a well-known place in the Maliki school (Al-Shatibi, 1997). The consequence for him is not free conjecture but is built upon the nature of conduct and the interest of the field: the expectation that offenders will collude to escape retaliation is a consequence directly connected to the incentive to evade punishment; the prevention of the mixing of seed is a consequence bearing upon the establishment of paternity and what follows from it in prohibition of marriage, inheritance and maintenance; and the command to document rests upon the expectation of forgetfulness, denial and dispute in deferred transactions (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990). The consideration of consequences thus performs a preventive function protecting the objective before its violation occurs, and part of Ibn al-'Arabi's jurisprudence may aptly be described as a jurisprudence of 'fortification' of the necessities: he builds around them means of proof, deterrence and safeguarding, and resists the devices that turn legal form into an instrument for demolishing the legal aim.

Summary of Chapter One

Table 2. Summary of Chapter One Analysis.

Function	The question it answers	Predominant instrument	Effect upon the ruling
Interpretive	What is the intended meaning of the text?	Context and the universals of the law	Delimiting the scope of the term and preventing fragmentary reading
Causal	Why was the ruling prescribed?	Wisdom, benefit and safeguarding	Disclosing the operative basis and linking branches to principles
Preferential	Which opinion is closest to the Lawgiver's intent?	The rule and the rank of the interest	Preferring the opinion that better preserves the necessity

Consequential-preventive	To what does the application lead?	Consideration of outcomes and blocking of means	Preventing evasion and the hollowing out of the ruling
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The table shows that the necessary objective does not operate at a single stage but moves from interpreting the meaning to justifying the ruling, then to preferring it and protecting its effect in application. These four functions are the criteria for analysing the models in the following chapter.

Chapter Two: The Five Necessary Objectives in the Applications of Ahkam al-Qur'an

1. The Preservation of Religion

The preservation of religion heads the necessities, since it concerns the very foundation of servitude to God and the survival of the reference by which the remaining rulings are ordered. It appears in Ibn al-'Arabi's exegesis of the verses of fighting, fitna, coercion and worship; the clearest model is his treatment of 'and fight them until there is no fitna and religion belongs to God' (Q. 2:193), where he interpreted fitna as unbelief together with the turning of people away from their religion and the torture of Muslims to make them recant (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990).

"If they disbelieved in the Sacred Mosque, worshipped idols therein, and there tortured the people of Islam to turn them from their religion, all of that is fitna"

The first function of the objective here is interpretive, determining the meaning of 'fitna' by reference to the context of the verses and to '*and fitna is graver than killing*' (Q. 2:217) (Al-Tabari, 2000). The second is causal, since the legitimacy of repulsion is tied to the removal of religious persecution and obstruction from the path of God. The third is the ordering of interests, for encroachment upon religion was reckoned a grave harm justifying its repulsion by the lawful means available in its context.

In his exegesis of '*there is no compulsion in religion*' (Q. 2:256) Ibn al-'Arabi distinguishes an invalid compulsion occurring as an act of injustice from a form of obligation that he regarded as falling within the order of religion in certain cases as framed by the jurisprudence of his time (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1999). This passage reveals the centrality of the preservation of religion in his construction, but it equally reveals the necessity of a critical and contextual reading: his formulations are bound to the system of political and religious relations of his age and to the chapters on apostasy and warfare as framed by the jurists of his time, and they may not be transferred mechanically to the reality of the modern state, nor may the objective be made a pretext for widening compulsion for the objective itself ought to be read in the light of the totality of the texts, of justice, of the preservation of life, of the inviolability of aggression, and of the distinction between inward belief and public order (Ibn Ashur, 2004).

The preservation of religion is not confined to repelling aggression but is realised positively on al-Shatibi's division (Al-Shatibi, 1997) by establishing acts of worship, teaching the rulings and safeguarding the community's rites; the questions of prayer, fasting and almsgiving in the book fall under the aim of preserving the bond with God and the continuity of religious order, the objective performing there an organising function that gathers scattered rulings under their aim (Anonymous, 2011). It emerges that the preservation of religion operates for him on several levels: determining the meaning of the texts concerning fitna and obstruction; justifying the legislation for establishing and defending religion; and ordering the objective in cases of competition though the strength of the objective does not dispense with the disciplines of application, lest the preservation of religion become a slogan justifying the violation of life or of justice, both of which are likewise objectives of the law.

2. The Preservation of Life

The preservation of life appears in the chapters on retaliation, blood money, necessity, warfare and the prohibition of aggression. The model most revealing of juristic construction is the question of killing a group for a single victim, in connection with '*in retaliation there is life for you, O people of understanding*' (Q. 2:179). The point at issue is the objection that equivalence is a condition of retaliation and that there is no equivalence between one and many. The majority of jurists — among them the Malikis — held that a group is killed for one victim, arguing from 'Umar b. al-Khattab's judgement concerning the boy treacherously killed at San'a' and his statement, 'Had the people of San'a' conspired against him, I would have killed them all' (Malik, 2004); a group dissented, as Ibn al-Mundhir reported and al-Qurtubi transmitted (Al-Qurtubi, 1964). Ibn al-'Arabi presented the question among the issues of the verse of retaliation and supported the position of the majority (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990).

The purposive construction of the majority position — as developed in the Maliki school to which Ibn al-'Arabi belongs — rests upon an explicit behavioural consequence: were it known that a group is not killed for one victim, collusion would become an organised means

of escaping punishment and of enabling enemies to kill their adversaries jointly, so that the deterrence expressly stated in the verse would be nullified. Al-Qurtubi — who draws extensively upon Ibn al-'Arabi in his legal rulings — formulated the substance of this argument in his comprehensive statement: “*Were a group to know that if they killed one man they would not be killed, enemies would collude in killing their adversaries by sharing in the act... and observing this rule is more fitting than observing the wordings*” A note on attribution: the maxim 'observing the rule is more fitting than observing the wordings' is ascribed in some studies to Ibn al-'Arabi himself, whereas what is established by collation is its occurrence in this wording in al-Qurtubi in the place cited (Al-Qurtubi, 1964); and since al-Qurtubi draws heavily upon Ibn al-'Arabi in his legal rulings (Kambal, 2021), it is not improbable that the substance originates with him. The present study nonetheless attributes the wording to its verified place and, as regards Ibn al-'Arabi, confines itself to establishing the substance of the consequence-based argument from the questions of the verse in his own book (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990), pending collation of his text against a reliable edition.

Whether the wording belongs to Ibn al-'Arabi or to al-Qurtubi following him, the functional analysis is unchanged: the equivalence intended in retaliation is justice in assigning responsibility for the killing to the offenders, not an arithmetical equivalence making the multiplicity of perpetrators a ground for the lapse of the right; an opinion that appears to protect the principle of equivalence ends in practice by nullifying deterrence and thus colliding with the objective expressly stated in the verse. Here the preservation of life performs a preferential and a consequential function at once: it prefers a systemic reading of the verse over a narrow numerical one. The preservation of life is likewise evident in the rules of necessity: prohibition in matters of food is not intended to destroy the person obliged, and therefore what is forbidden is permitted to one in dire need to the extent that repels destruction (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990). The objective here operates toward alleviation, contrary to retaliation where it operates toward firmness; and this duality is significant: an objective does not equal a fixed juristic outcome but determines what preserves the foundation in each context. From the standpoint of juristic construction, the preservation of life is bound up with procedural justice as well, since retaliation rests not upon private anger but upon the establishment of the offence and the assessment of responsibility; the invocation of the preservation of life is therefore incomplete without preserving the life of the accused from punishment without proof, without distinguishing intentional from accidental killing, and without regard for the right of the heirs, pardon and blood money within the system drawn by the texts (Al-Bukhari, 2001).

3. The Preservation of Intellect

The intellect is the instrument of legal responsibility and discernment, and its preservation is therefore necessary for understanding religion and managing worldly affairs (Al-Ghazali, 1993). This objective is manifest in Ibn al-'Arabi's exegesis of *'they ask you about wine and gambling: say: in them is great sin and benefits for people, but their sin is greater than their benefit'* (Q. 2:219): he set out the aspects of benefit — profit, pleasure, and what some claimed of bodily benefit — and then held that pleasure does not compensate for what wine takes away of attainment, intellect and discernment (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990). “*As for pleasure, it is harm in the estimation of rational people, for what it brings of pleasure does not compensate for what it takes away of attainment and intellect... and its destruction of the benefit of attainment and discernment* (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990)”

This model rests upon an explicit purposive weighing between a partial benefit and a necessary harm. The text does not deny the existence of certain benefits, but their weight does not depend upon their mere existence: it depends upon their rank, their persistence and their effects — occasional profit or momentary pleasure does not counterbalance the loss of the intellect by which legal responsibility is realised, dispositions are regulated and the remaining interests preserved (Al-Shatibi, 1997). The objective of preserving the intellect thus operates as a criterion for ordering benefits and harms, not merely as a cause supplied after the prohibition. The interpretive function appears in determining what is meant by 'benefits': not every benefit is legally recognised, and benefit does not suffice to permit an act when its harm predominates or when that harm touches a higher necessity.

From the standpoint of juristic construction, the preservation of the intellect links the individual ruling to the social order: the loss of discernment harms not only the drinker but opens the doors to aggression against life, property and honour, suspends obligations and undermines the capacity to transact. The preservation of the intellect thus becomes a servant of the remaining necessities and is served by them (Al-Fasi, 1993). This method may be applied to contemporary questions on condition of discipline: substances or practices affecting perception are to be assessed by reliable medical and social measures, their benefits and harms weighed by degree, prevalence and available alternatives, and mere verbal analogy with wine

is not sufficient — the methodological lesson being a weighing built upon the reality of the effect and the rank of the interest, not impressionistic analogy (Al-Raysuni, 1995).

4. The Preservation of Lineage, Paternity and Honour

The preservation of lineage concerns the continuation of the human species within a framework establishing paternity, rights and responsibilities, and to it is joined the preservation of honour and of the family (Ibn Ashur, 2004). It appears in the rules of marriage, divorce, waiting periods, *istibra'*, suckling, unlawful intercourse and slanderous accusation. Among the indicative texts is Ibn al-'Arabi's exegesis of '*chaste women, not given to fornication nor taking secret lovers*' (Q. 4:25), where he interpreted *ihsan* as chastity — *ihsan* deriving lexically from *hisn*, denoting prevention and protection (Ibn Faris, 1979)— and linked its stipulation to the safeguarding of licit seed against illicit and the prevention of confused lineages (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990).

"God stipulated that only as a safeguarding of licit seed against illicit seed... for therein lies the mixing of sound lineages with corrupt seed (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990)"

In this passage the justification goes beyond judging conduct to protecting a wide network of rights: paternity, inheritance, maintenance, prohibition of marriage, guardianship and the responsibility of upbringing; for the confusion of lineage is not a symbolic harm but a legal and social disorder extending across generations. *Istibra'* therefore performs an evidentiary and preventive function, and its determined period becomes a means of verifying the vacancy of the womb. The preservation of lineage performs a preferential function when prohibition is chosen until *istibra'* is accomplished, since the possibility of mixed seed touches a necessity not easily remedied after the fact — and here the principle of caution in matters of paternity and the connection of the objective with the blocking of means become evident.

The scope of the objective widens in reading the verses of slanderous accusation and mutual imprecation (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990); for the preservation of honour is not confined to preventing indecency but includes preventing accusation without proof and protecting reputation from assault. This balance is essential in juristic construction: safeguarding the family is achieved not only by severity toward conduct but also by procedures of proof that prevent defamation and calumny, so that the texts of the prescribed penalty, of testimony and of mutual imprecation complement one another in distributing the burden of proof and protecting the necessity from both sides (Al-Bukhari, 2001). Contemporary appropriation of this objective requires regard for the development of medical and legal means of proof, distinguishing the certain from the probable, while human dignity and the concealment of private failings remain governing disciplines (Al-Fasi, 1993).

5. The Preservation of Property

Property is the support of livelihood and the means of realising many interests of religion and worldly life; the law therefore surrounded it with rules of acquisition, ownership, exchange, documentation, and the prohibition of destruction, theft, usurpation and consuming property unjustly (Al-Ghazali, 1993). The objective of preserving property appears clearly in Ibn al-'Arabi's exegesis of the verse of debt: '*O you who believe, when you contract a debt for a stated term, write it down*' (Q. 2:282); from the command to document and to call witnesses he inferred an indication of the safeguarding and preservation of property (Ibn al-'Arabi, 2003)

"Since God commanded documentation by testimony over rights, that is an indication of care in observing property and preserving it" (Ibn al-'Arabi, 2003)

This justification reveals that writing is not a formality detached from the substance of contractual justice: a deferred debt is exposed to forgetfulness, denial, the death of a party and disagreement among heirs, and documentation transforms the right from a contestable claim into a legal position capable of proof. The preservation of property thus operates at a stage prior to litigation, building a procedural prevention that reduces dispute and preserves confidence in transactions. The objective likewise explains the rules concerning the property of orphans and the incompetent (Ibn al-'Arabi, 2003): ownership does not entail unrestricted disposal by an owner lacking the capacity that protects his property, and therefore certain dispositions are restricted and guardianship established to safeguard the asset — on condition that the restriction be for the owner's benefit and under supervision preventing the guardian's exploitation. In the prohibition of usury, theft, usurpation and consuming people's property unjustly, the negative aspect of the objective appears (Al-Shatibi, 1997). Not Now the preservation of property does not mean the sanctification of wealth apart from justice: almsgiving, maintenance and guarantees regulate the social function of property, so that the objective preserves lawful ownership and just circulation rather than every accumulation, however unjustly acquired (Al-Fasi, 1993). From the standpoint of preference, the preservation of property permits the assessment of procedures according to their capacity to reduce risk and secure proof; electronic documentation and digital contracts may be brought

under the same aim wherever they achieve identification of the parties, soundness of consent and access to the record. This is an important methodological fruit: the objective is constant, while the means develop according to custom and experience (Al-Raysuni, 1993).

An Inductive Map of the Principal Models

Table 3. Analysis of Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah Objectives and Their Functions in Legal Construction.

Objective	Text / question	Preserving meaning	Function of the objective	Outcome of juristic construction
Religion	Q. 2:193, fitna	Removal of obstruction and religious persecution	Interpretive and causal	Determining the meaning of fitna and tying repulsion to the protection of religion
Life	Q. 2:178-179, killing a group for one	Deterrence and prevention of escape by collusion	Preferential and consequential	Preferring the rule preserving life over a narrow numerical reading
Intellect	Q. 2:219, wine	Survival of attainment and discernment	Weighing and ordering of interests	Preponderance of necessary harm over occasional benefit
Lineage	Q. 4:25, chastity and istibra'	Prevention of confused lineages	Causal and preventive	Stipulating what verifies the vacancy of the womb and safeguards paternity
Property	Q. 2:282, documentation of debt	Proof of rights and prevention of denial	Causal and procedural	Confirming writing and testimony as means of preservation

Chapter Three: The Effect of the Necessary Objectives upon his Juristic Method

1. From the Thematic to the Functional Objective

The foregoing survey shows that classifying texts under the five necessities is only a first step; the deeper analytical value emerges when one asks what the objective did within the argument. The same objective may recur with different functions: the preservation of life justifies the prohibition of killing, prefers retaliation in the case of collusion, warrants the dispensation for one in dire need, and restricts the exercise of force within the bounds of justice. The thematic objective 'preservation of life' therefore yields no single ruling but operates as a criterion determining the appropriate ruling according to the structure of the case. Moreover, from this a reading model for Ibn al-'Arabi's texts may be formulated in five questions: what is the particular text? which necessity is exposed to preservation or violation? what is the lawful means of preservation? which opinion realises the aim without nullifying another proof? and what is the consequence of generalising the ruling? This model permits an understanding of his preferences more precise than the mere attribution of an opinion to the school. It also shows that the objectives do not operate in isolation: in wine the intellect is preserved and, through it, life, property and religion; in paternity the child, the family and financial rights are preserved; and in the documentation of debt property is preserved and dispute prevented. This interlocking requires that the necessities not be turned into separate compartments but be regarded as a mutually supporting system of interests (Al-Shatibi, 1997).

2. The Objective as an Instrument for Disciplining Signification

Determining signification is among the stages of ijtihad most exposed to fragmentation, for a term may be construed in a sense linguistically sound yet out of keeping with the context of the legislation. Ibn al-'Arabi offers models showing that an objective may serve as a semantic indicator: the interpretation of fitna does not rest upon the lexicon alone but upon the context of turning people from religion; the understanding of equivalence in retaliation does not stop at number but at the justice of responsibility and the realisation of life; and the determination of the benefit of wine does not equate fleeting pleasure with a legally recognised benefit (Ibn al-'Arabi, 1990). This function must nonetheless be disciplined lest it become the imposition upon the text of what it cannot bear. The discipline is that the objective be established inductively or by a recognised text (Al-Shatibi, 1997); that the chosen meaning be linguistically and contextually admissible; that it gathers the proofs rather than nullify some of them (Ibn Faris, 1979); and that the interest be assessed by recognised means of knowledge. Thus the objective resists two defects: a literalism isolating the part from its system, and a utilitarianism releasing benefit from the constraints of the text; the middle reading begins

from recognised signification and then tests its coherence with the universals and the reports (Al-Raysuni, 1995).

3. The Objective as a Criterion for Ordering Proofs and Opinions

Where opinions are multiple it does not suffice to enumerate them; the weight of each must be shown. In Ibn al-'Arabi the necessary objective grants certain proofs an added force by connecting them with the general system of the legislation: the position that a group is killed for one victim rests not upon 'Umar's judgement alone (Malik, 2004) but upon its coherence with the rule of retaliation and its deterrent consequence; the position requiring *istibra'* gains strength from the safeguarding of paternity; and the command to document is read as an embodiment of the preservation of property. Now the objective is not an automatically decisive card: objectives may conflict, or the means of realising them may be several, and then the rank, the certainty, the generality and the alternatives must be examined: the preservation of property in a given procedure may be merely probable while a certain privacy or justice is violated by it, and a claim of preserving religion may be raised in a context wholly different from its original one. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the established objective from the assessment of the means, and the legal aim from the historical reading of its application (Gharghadu, 2015). This distinction permits an understanding of Ibn al-'Arabi without sanctifying every preference: a purposive method may be strong while its application to a particular question remains open to criticism on account of the perception of reality, the authenticity of a proof, or the extent of the interest.

4. The Objective and the Consideration of Consequences

The consideration of consequences is the link between jurisprudence and reality, since a ruling is not implemented in a vacuum. In Ibn al-'Arabi it appears in preventing collective escape from retaliation, in safeguarding lineages before their confusion, and in documenting rights before dispute; these applications share the jurist's movement from remedying harm to building barriers preventing its occurrence (Al-Shatibi, 1997). Consequences in his work may be analysed into three kinds: a behavioural consequence relating to individual incentives, as in the collusion of offenders; an evidentiary consequence relating to the difficulty of proving a right after the loss of a document or the confusion of paternity; and a systemic consequence relating to the subversion of the ruling's function when an exception is generalised. These three kinds give purposive reasoning greater precision and prevent 'consequences' from becoming a loose expression. Consequences require a knowledge of reality no less than a knowledge of the text; adjudication and social experience were two important sources for Ibn al-'Arabi (Al-Badawi, 2022), whereas today statistics and medical, economic and legal expertise enter in. The principle, however, is constant: a jurist may not claim a consequence without reasonable evidence, nor build a general prohibition upon a rare possibility, nor neglect the effects of a ruling upon different groups.

5. The Relation between School Affiliation and Purposive Ijtihad

Ibn al-'Arabi belongs to the Malikis and employs the school's principles and terminology, yet the objectives at times afford him room to interpret and support the school or to transcend an opinion within it (Al-Tannani, 2012). His relation to the school may be described as one of critical affiliation: he begins from its heritage but examines the arguments and weighs the outcomes. This does not mean that he was wholly free of partisanship, for his expression grew severe in places and affiliation may have influenced his choices; yet the presence of justification and preference permits his position to be evaluated by criteria open to discussion (Al-Badawi, 2022). The Maliki particularity appears in the presence of benefit, the blocking of means and the operation of rules; but to refer every purposive application to a general 'Malikism' deprives it of precision, since some of it rests upon an explicit text, some upon induction, and some upon judicial experience. The result is that the school is for him neither an external constraint nor merely a store of conclusions, but a framework from which he learned the ways of connecting branches to universals; and the value of *ijtihad* appears when he does not rest content with transmission but shows why an opinion realises a legal interest, how it prevents a harm, and what the effect of the alternative would be.

6. Characteristics and Limits of his Purposive Practice

The characteristics of Ibn al-'Arabi's application of objectives can be described through several aspects. Integration refers to the fact that the objectives appear within the analysis of the verse and the legal question, rather than being presented as a separate homiletic appendix (Al-Tannani, 2012). Operation indicates that the objective is utilized to understand the term, justify the ruling, prefer an opinion, and consider the consequence. Complementarity shows that the objective interacts with language, hadith, transmitted reports, legal principles, and school doctrine (Muhyi al-Din and Zakariyya, 2020). Prevention reflects his tendency to protect the necessity before its loss through documentation, *istibra'*, deterrence, and the blocking of means. Disciplined flexibility demonstrates that an objective may require either a

firm ruling or a dispensation depending on the nature of the danger. Realism highlights the influence of judicial experience in his assessment of human conduct and the consequences of legal rulings (Al-Badawi, 2022).

As for the limits, the purposive terminology was not for him a complete independent system as it became for later scholars (Al-Shatibi, 1997); some applications are affected by the jurisprudence of his age and its conception of political and social relations; the force of his school idiom may at times obscure the complexity of the evidence; and the assessment of interest and consequence may remain a matter of *ijtihad* requiring information unavailable in his time. It is therefore necessary to distinguish three levels: the establishment of the objective, the soundness of the methodological rule, and the accuracy of its application to the case — the first two may be sound while the third remains open to revision.

7. The Contemporary Value of the Method

The first value lies in restoring the connection between particulars and universals: new questions are not settled by resemblance to old forms alone, but require determining the necessary interest, describing the reality, testing the means and considering the consequence — and Ibn al-'Arabi's applications offer an early model of this movement from the ruling to its system (Gharghadu, 2015). The second is the development of a jurisprudence of procedure: the preservation of property is for him bound to documentation and testimony, the preservation of paternity to *istibra'* and proof, and the preservation of life to just deterrence, showing that objectives are realised not by slogans but by institutions and procedures that prevent dispute, protect the weak and distribute the burdens of proof (Al-Fasi, 1993). The third is the critique of the selective use of the objectives: Ibn al-'Arabi's method at its best joins text and objective without separating them, so that the preservation of property may not be invoked to justify prohibited transactions, nor the preservation of religion to nullify justice, nor the preservation of the family to abolish individual dignity, nor the preservation of life without judicial guarantees; the objectives are a balanced network operating under the authority of evidence and justice (Al-Shatibi, 1997). The fourth is the possibility of building comparative studies within the works of the *Ahkam al-Qur'an* genre: comparing the employment of the necessities in Ibn al-'Arabi, al-Qurtubi and others (Al-Qurtubi, 1964), and studying the differences among theoretical environments in operating the objectives; thereby purposive research moves from general theorising to the analysis of historical juristic practice.

Conclusion

After surveying and analysing the models of the necessary objectives in *Ahkam al-Qur'an*, the study concludes that the objectives in Qadi Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi constitute an internal component of juristic construction: they appear not only in explicit mention of preservation or benefit, but in the manner of defining the point at issue, choosing the meaning of a term, justifying a ruling, weighing benefits and harms, preferring among opinions, and assessing outcomes. These functions enabled him to link the particular to the universal and to forestall readings that would empty the legislation of its effect.

Principal Findings

Juristic construction in Ibn al-'Arabi rests upon the interaction of text, language, transmitted reports, legal principles, school doctrine, and judicial experience, with the necessary objectives entering this interaction as criteria of understanding and evaluation. The presence of the necessities is not confined to naming the objectives but appears in functional vocabulary such as safeguarding, preservation, the rule, benefit, necessity, and consequence. The functions of the objectives in the book may be reduced to four principal ones: interpretive, causal, preferential, and consequential-preventive, with more than one function potentially combining in a single model.

The preservation of religion performed an interpretive and causal function in the reading of the verses on *fitna* and obstruction, while some of its applications require a historical and critical reading disciplined by the totality of the universals. The preservation of life was among the objectives most influential in preference: support for killing a group for one victim was built upon a behavioural consequence preventing collusion from becoming a means of escape, and upon a systemic rather than numerical understanding of equivalence. Ibn al-'Arabi built his treatment of wine upon a weighing between an occasional benefit and a harm affecting intellect and discernment, revealing an awareness of the ranks of benefits and harms. The preservation of lineage directed the rules of chastity and *istibra'*, linking them to the prevention of confused lineages and the safeguarding of family rights resulting from them. The preservation of property appeared in transforming writing and testimony into procedural means of protecting rights before disputes arise, highlighting the institutional dimension of the objectives.

A single objective does not yield a fixed ruling in all circumstances; rather, it may require firmness or alleviation according to what preserves the necessity in a particular case. Consequences in Ibn al-'Arabi are of three kinds, namely behavioural, evidentiary, and systemic, and this classification prevents the term "consequences" from becoming a loose expression. Ibn al-'Arabi's practice represents an intermediate link in the history of the purposive idea, between al-Ghazali's theorising on benefit and its full elaboration by al-Shatibi. The scholarly value of his method does not entail acceptance of all his applications; therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the establishment of the objective, the soundness of the rule, and the accuracy of its historical application.

Recommendations

To prepare a digital thematic index of the passages on objectives, interests, and consequences in Ahkam al-Qur'an, linked to the verses, questions, and the four argumentative functions, as a database for researchers. To verify the attribution of the maxim "observing the rule is more fitting than observing the wordings" by collating the editions of Ahkam al-Qur'an and al-Jami' li-Ahkam al-Qur'an, and to study the extent of al-Qurtubi's dependence upon Ibn al-'Arabi in purposive questions in particular. To conduct a comparative study between Ibn al-'Arabi, al-Qurtubi, and other authors of the Ahkam al-Qur'an genre in their employment of the necessities, so as to measure the effect of theoretical affiliation upon the operation of the objectives. To extend research to the needed and improving objectives in Ibn al-'Arabi and their relation to the necessities in cases of competition. To adopt the threefold distinction (objective/rule/application) in contemporary purposive research, so that the objectives do not become general phrases justifying predetermined conclusions. To attend to the procedural and institutional dimension of the objectives in juristic studies, since preservation is realised through documentation, guarantees, and proof as much as through substantive rulings.

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